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Jacques Derrida divides all texts into two categories in light of human encounters 
with animals. On the one hand are texts produced by those who may have devoted 
thought and attention to animals but have not imagined that animals might have a gaze of 
their own directed back at humans. On the other hand are texts produced by those whose 
thought and attention to animals has indeed been troubled, perplexed, and complicated by 
the recognition of an animal’s reciprocal gaze. Derrida’s own text, “The Animal That 
Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” in which he distinguishes between these two kinds of 
texts, itself belongs to the latter category, as does J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals. 
The struggle to comprehend animals apart from the use of humans as a standard 
for evaluating and describing consciousness and being produces in one engaged in such a 
struggle a profound disposition of uncertainty not only regarding animals but regarding 
the capacity of a human self to have knowledge of a human or non-human other. Derrida 
and Coetzee’s texts perform this uncertainty in both the arguments they advance and—
more importantly—in the form their arguments take. 
The uncertainty they articulate and produce is a model of efficacious uncertainty, 
a rhetorical disposition that is the foundation of a productive mode of thinking, one that 
allows for multiplicity and resists the gestures of exclusion characterizing the various 
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The pride connected with knowing and sensing lies like a blinding fog over the 
eyes and senses of men, thus deceiving them concerning the value of existence. 
—Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense” 
I mean Negative Capability, that is, when a man is capable of being in 
uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and 
reason. 
—John Keats, letter to George and Thomas Keats 
 
The disciplines of the humanities have counterintuitively taken an interest in 
animals, a phenomenon which Harriet Ritvo refers to as the animal turn. “[D]uring the 
last several decades,” she writes, “animals have emerged as a more frequent focus of 
scholarship in the humanities and social sciences, as quantified in published books and 
articles, conference presentations, new societies and new journals.”1 The turn includes 
scholarship in rhetoric, beginning with George A. Kennedy’s article “A Hoot in the Dark: 
The Evolution of General Rhetoric” in 1992, and revisited in “Rhetoric among Social 
Animals,” the first chapter of his Comparative Rhetoric: An Historical and Cross-
Cultural Introduction.2 According to Debra Hawhee, the initial response to Kennedy’s 
work was “befuddlement,” yet while his interest in animals may have been initially 
“untimely,” it came to be more “time[ly] than ever,”3 as evidenced by the forum on 
                                                 
1. Harriet Ritvo, “On the Animal Turn,” Daedalus 136, no. 4 (2007): 119.  
2. George A. Kennedy, “A Hoot in the Dark: The Evolution of General Rhetoric,” Philosophy and 
Rhetoric 25, no. 1 (1992): 1-21; Kennedy, Comparative Rhetoric: An Historical and Cross-Cultural 
Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).  






animals and rhetoric in Philosophy and Rhetoric in 2011 in which Hawee makes these 
retrospective comments on Kennedy. Diane Davis, in addition to a contribution to that 
same forum,4 had written about animals somewhat tangentially in her book Inessential 
Solidarity: Rhetoric and Foreigner Relations, but more recently has brought animals to 
the fore of her work. In “Autozoography: Notes Toward a Rhetoricity of the Living,” she 
complicates philosophical assertions that the self-referential I foundational to 
consciousness and language is peculiarly human by considering the work of biologists 
from Carl Linnaeus down to the present decade. In the aforementioned forum in 
Philosophy and Rhetoric, John Muckelbauer called for “reconceiv[ing] difference 
(between and within species) as something other than a clumsy hierarchy,”5 and Davis 
moves in that direction be reconfiguring the hierarchical binaries of difference 
constitutive of so much of the Western tradition as a mutual relation in which the I of 
consciousness and language does not exist prior to the object of thought and speech: 
“[W]ithout an other, a trace of differentiation, there is no need or possibility for self-
reference. The I, posing itself in its ‘living presence,’ is already an effect of what we 
might call this rhetoricity of the living, a specter born each time in an underivable and 
extrahuman rhetorical relation.”6 
                                                 
4. Diane Davis, “Creaturely Rhetorics,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 44, no. 1 (2011): 88-94; Davis, 
“P.S. on Humanism” in Inessential Solidarity: Rhetoric and Foreigner Relations (Pittsburgh: U of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2010), 144-166. 
5. John Muckelbauer, “Domesticating Animal Theory,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 44, no. 1 (2011): 
100. 
6. Diane Davis, “Autozoography: Notes Toward a Rhetoricity of the Living,” Philosophy and 





In my own consideration of the texts below, I want to articulate how that I, 
already unstable and multiple,7 might be further destabilized and troubled by encounters 
with alterity—human, animal, or otherwise. I understand my own struggle to think about 
these matters as ultimately being a response to another of Muckelbauer’s “paths” 
articulated in the Philosophy and Rhetoric forum: “Problematizing the classical 
opposition between (instinctive, animal) reaction and (thoughtful, human) response,” 
which is “something different from rejecting, resolving, or even from dialoguing—each 
of which might well structurally privilege the familiar human logos.”8 What I am trying 
to write is an apologia for uncertainty. 
J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals and Jacques Derrida’s “The Animal That 
Therefore I Am (More to Follow)” present encounters with animals mediated by texts. 
They are texts that self-consciously confound their own mediating roles as texts. Their 
representations of encounters between the human “self” and the animal “other” 
emphasize not what might be knowable about either the self or the other, but instead 
emphasize the difficulty of knowing either the self or the other. They cast doubt on the 
immediacy of encounters between humans and animals and cast doubt on the immediacy 
of encounters between humans and other humans, a problem the texts themselves 
perform.  
Human responses to animal encounters (in books, in the field, in laboratories, in 
laps, on dinner plates) generally oscillate between two modes, but remain oriented by the 
                                                 
7. “Pure autoaffectation turns out to be an irreducible hetero-affection in which the ‘sameness’ has 
already welcomed within itself the trace of an ‘otherness,’ and the me to which I intend(s) to point has 
already made tracks.” Ibid., 540.  





same distinction marked by the paired words human and animal. One mode of response 
is to emphasize dissimilarity between the pair, granting a soul, a mind, passions, and 
language to the human while depriving the animal of the same. The other mode is to 
emphasize similarity between the pair, either by attributing to the animal the same 
privileged qualities the other mode reserves for the human, or by debasing (as it were) the 
human to an animalistic nature. But emphasizing similarity does not collapse the 
distinction between the human and animal pair and both modes of response seem to rely 
equally on fanciful and whimsical assertions about the human as much as about the 
animal. And neither mode exceeds its limitation as inevitably and ultimately 
anthropocentric, as both modes are human responses to the human and animal encounter. 
Coetzee and Derrida’s texts describe and perform both modes of response to the 
human encounter with the animal, yet the effects of texts are not to correct, perfect, or 
exceed either mode, nor to cut through the perplexing fold between the human and the 
animal, but to fold and fold it again, to multiply its perplexity, to further confound rather 
than clarify. Through the effects of their forms and formal features, the two texts gesture 
vaguely toward an indeterminate thought, a conceptual negative space characterized by 
uncertainty, circumspection, confusion, apophasis, failure, vacillation, ignorance—and 
not just in reference to the human/animal distinction. But, I will suggest, my reading of 
the two texts does not necessarily lead to a sterile nihilism, and experiences such as 
uncertainty and confusion might be productive. 
 
Novelist J. M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals is not a novel and not even quite 





but it is also the transcript of Coetzee’s participation in the 1997-1998 Tanner Lectures 
on Human Values at Princeton University. In The Lives of Animals, Coetzee tells a story 
about a fictional novelist, Elizabeth Costello, delivering an invited lecture at a fictional 
university on the ethics of the human treatment of animals. The narrative has many 
essayistic features, even when it moves beyond Costello’s initial lecture to subsequent 
dialogue: characters advance genuine arguments and the topic of animal ethics is not 
merely a pretense for telling a story. But neither is the story merely a pretense for 
advancing an argument: the characters are fully formed and their conflicts are more than 
intellectual. Together, both story and argument are preoccupied with animal ethics and a 
problem fundamental to narrative, rhetoric, and ethics alike, which is the difficulty of 
shared thought and experience between two beings, whether those beings are human or 
animal. Coetzee’s presentation of the problem in The Lives of Animals can be parsed in 
three dimensions: the narrative’s presentation as a lecture (and the lecture’s presentation 
as a narrative), the philosophical exchanges within the narrative, and the narrative 
episodes that frame the philosophical exchanges. 
Fiction is already heavy with contradictions, ambiguities, ironies, and multiple 
perspectives. Assertions about which voice in a work of fiction belongs to the author—or, 
disregarding the author, which voice speaks for the text as a whole—are difficult tomake: 
a work of fiction has more readings than readers. Academic texts like monographs, 
journal articles, and lectures might also be said to have more readings that readers, but 
such academic texts, as opposed to fiction, are more plausibly be read as avowals. 





to convince the reader to understand and accept it, too, and so has carefully demarcated 
what the author has “said” from what others have “said.” 
Coetzee’s palindromic ploy of delivering a lecture that is a work of fiction about 
an author giving a lecture compounds the difficulty in reading his text, whether as a 
member of the lecture’s immediate audience or as a later reader of the printed narrative. 
Coetzee’s words, as a lecture, presumably are intended to communicate something that 
Coetzee wishes his audience to accept, but the audience is vexed at every turn by the fact 
that they are not hearing a speech but listening to (or reading) a story. Coetzee’s text is 
spoken but not pronounced, told though not a tale. A gap between author and text 
becomes apparent, a dissociation between speaker and speech emerges. That gap or 
dissociation perhaps might be found in any text (spoken or written), but the compound 
lecture/narrative form of The Lives of Animals brings it to the fore as a preoccupation of 
the reader (or listener), who is unable to discern whether the gap is made wider by the 
compound lecture/narrative form or made narrower by it. Should the audience make a 
close identification between Coetzee and his creature, Costello, taking what she says as 
his words, too? Maybe the correct identification is between Coetzee and Costello’s 
dissenters? Or could making such identifications be altogether mistaken and Coetzee’s 
characters are strangers to him? Authorial intent aside, the rhetorical intent of the text is 
confused: to which position, if any, does the text attempt to persuade the reader? A few 
episodes from The Lives of Animals demonstrate the confusion brought on by the 
combination of fiction and lecture. 
The first and least example is a comparison of Costello with another character, 





between Coetzee and Costello comes in Costello’s seminar discussion, which turns at one 
point to a discussion of Gulliver’s Travels. Costello, an Australian, offhandedly refers to 
herself as an “ex-colonial” and suggests that this influences her perspective on Gulliver’s 
Travels.9 Coetzee, a South African (and later naturalized Australian), is likewise an “ex-
colonial” whose works have been concerned with postcolonial political and social 
realities. A correspondence between Coetzee and Costello seems natural here. Later in 
the story, during Costello’s debate with philosophy professor O’Hearne, it is O’Hearne, 
not Costello, who at first seems to speak from the “ex-colonial” perspective, arguing that 
contemporary concerns over animals are a colonial symptom. He calls the “animal-rights 
movement…yet another Western crusade against the practices of the rest of the world, 
claiming universality for what are simply its own standards.”10 Costello’s rejoinder is that 
“those who pioneered the industrialization of animal lives and the commodification of 
animal flesh should be at the forefront of trying to atone for it.”11 
When O’Hearne critiques the West, one might be inclined to hear Coetzee’s voice 
as an “ex-colonial” speaking through him. In the first instance, in the discussion of 
Gulliver’s Travels, identification of Costello as Coetzee’s mouthpiece seems reasonable. 
But in the second instance, in the debate with O’Hearne, Costello’s interlocutor seems 
also to correspond to Coetzee’s voice. Even so, Costello’s response to O’Hearne’s 
critique of the West is itself a critique of the West and both positions seem to plausibly 
belong to the “ex-colonial” Coetzee. And a suspicious reader might wonder if the racial 
                                                 
9. J.M. Coetzee, The Lives of Animals, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2001), 57. 
10. Ibid., 60. 





identity of the author and his characters allows any of them to legitimately occupy the 
position of “ex-colonial.”  In any case, Coetzee’s text does not present a directly didactic 
voice, a single thread of argument located in a single character. 
 The difficulty of recognizing an identification between Coetzee and any of the 
characters or arguments in his text is better seen in a comparison of Costello with her 
daughter-in-law Norma. The two are opposed on intellectual points and their familial 
relationship is likewise fraught, but naming one as the protagonist and the other as the 
antagonist—and thus identifying the arguments of the more sympathetic character as 
those the author wishes the reader to accept—is not without problems. The topic of 
vegetarianism is a point of overlap between the intellectual and personal conflicts 
between Costello and Norma. 
Costello presents herself, in some moments, as moderate and level-headed on the 
issue of animals’ rights and her own practice of vegetarianism. At the formal dinner 
following Costello’s initial lecture, the president of the college tells her, “[I] have a great 
respect for [vegetarianism] . . . [a]s a way of life.” Costello points out that she is “wearing 
leather shoes” and “carrying a leather purse,” and she counters: “I wouldn’t have 
overmuch respect if I were you.”12 And in the debate with O’Hearne, Costello says she is 
“wary of exclusionary gestures,” philosophical ones or social ones: “I know of one 
prominent philosopher who states that he is simply not prepared to philosophize about 
animals with people who eat meat. I am not sure I would go as far as that . . . .”13 But to 
Costello’s family, including her son, but especially Norma, Costello’s practice of 
                                                 
12. Ibid., 43. 





vegetarianism seems to indeed be about exclusion, and, in the end, about power. To her 
family, Costello’s position on animals’ rights and her practice of vegetarianism have a 
more pointed and shrill quality than they do in Costello’s public presentation of them. 
At the beginning of the story, when Costello arrives at her son’s home, a conflict 
ensues that is apparently a recurring one. The narrative, from the perspective of 
Costello’s son John, reads: “The children are eating separately because Elizabeth does 
not like to see meat on the table, while Norma refuses to change the children’s diet to suit 
what she calls ‘your mother’s delicate sensibilities’.”14 Costello’s son John fears that her 
outspoken vegetarianism will also be divisive at the formal dinner following her lecture, 
in what is likewise apparently a recurring conflict, a situation in which someone asks 
Costello why she is vegetarian and it falls to her son (“him and him alone”) to “repair the 
damage” of her acerbic response: “You ask me why I refuse to eat flesh. I, for my part, 
am astonished that you can put in your mouth the corpse of a dead animal, astonished that 
you do not find it nasty to chew hacked flesh and swallow the juices of death-wounds.”15 
And Norma describes her mother-in-law’s vegetarianism, in no uncertain terms, as 
insincere manipulation: 
“I would have more respect for her if she didn’t try to undermine me behind my 
back, with her stories to the children about poor little veal calves….It’s nothing 
but a power-game. Her great hero Franz Kafka played the same game with his 
family. He refused to eat this, he refused to eat that, he would rather starve, he 
said. Soon everyone was feeling guilty about eating in front of him, and he could 
sit back feeling virtuous. It’s a sick game, and I’m not having the children play it 
against me.”16 
 
                                                 
14. Ibid., 16. 
15. Ibid., 38. 





How Coetzee’s narrative depicts Costello and her vegetarianism is ambiguous. Is she 
sincere or does she have ulterior motives, perhaps hidden even from herself? And if the 
narrative is already unclear about the identification of Costello as a simple mouthpiece 
for Coetzee, then it is clearly unclear about a position on vegetarianism. Is the story 
Coetzee tells an argument for vegetarianism? Even to answer, “Yes…and no,” would 
betray unwarranted certainty. 
 But the difficulty of identifying Coetzee’s rhetorical intent in any character or 
argument of his lecture/narrative is best seen in the comparison of industrialized animal 
farming to the Holocaust. 
Announcing at the beginning of her lecture that she would be speaking “on the 
subject of animals,” Costello almost immediately begins discussing the Holocaust, in 
particular the Treblinka death camp. She discusses the Holocaust in general terms, 
invoking the staggering death counts, and emphasizing the tacit complicity of the people 
living near camps like Treblinka.17 By the time she draws a direct comparison between 
the Holocaust and practices of industrialized farming, her fictional audience (and 
Coetzee’s real audience), ought to have seen it coming, even if they are not fully prepared 
for the force of its statement: 
“Let me say it openly: we are surrounded by an enterprise of degradation, cruelty, 
and killing which rivals anything that the Third Reich was capable of, indeed 
dwarfs it, in that ours is an enterprise without end, self-regenerating, bringing 
rabbits, rats, poultry, livestock ceaselessly into the world for the purpose of killing 
them.”18 
 
                                                 
17. Ibid., 19-21. 





Whether one sees the comparison as valid, in poor taste, or otherwise, there is 
little in the narrative at this point to cue the reader that Coetzee may not be making the 
comparison himself: Costello’s lecture carries on for seventeen pages with only a few 
brief instances of narrative interruption, and the lecture comes immediately after only 
three brief pages of an introductory frame that in many ways underscores the parallels 
between Costello’s fictional lectureship and Coetzee’s actual lectureship. For a member 
of Coetzee’s immediate audience, these words would possibly have sounded like 
Coetzee’s own, ventriloquized through Costello: the audience would have heard these 
words from Coetzee’s own mouth with little narrative interjection to remind them that at 
this point Coetzee would be reading a story about a lecture, rather than simply giving a 
lecture. For a reader, the text itself would create a similar effect: Costello’s lecture is 
footnoted just as a transcript of an academic lecture would be. Six footnotes appear 
before Costello comments that she has done due academic diligence by providing 
citations in footnotes for her claims, and “in an uncharacteristic gesture, [she] raises and 
brandishes the text of her lecture in the air.”19 Do the footnotes, particularly those first 
six, belong to Coetzee as annotations of his story, or to Costello as annotations of the 
lecture Coetzee has contrived to have her speak? Did Coetzee, at this point in his 
delivery, also “raise and brandish” the pages from which he read? They are, nonetheless, 
genuine citations of source material; both Coetzee and Costello have done due diligence 
in the preparation of their lectures. 
 For one audience member in particular, Costello’s comparison of industrial 
farming to Nazi atrocities is not rhetorically successful, though not without effect. The 
                                                 





day following her lecture, Costello receives a note from a poet who had been in her 
audience. He indicts her not only of an intellectual misstep in the comparison she has 
made, but of an ethical offense: 
“You took over for your own purposes the familiar comparison between the 
murdered Jews of Europe and slaughtered cattle….You misunderstand the nature 
of likenesses; I would even say you misunderstand willfully, to the point of 
blasphemy…If Jews were treated like cattle, it does not follow that cattle are 
treated like Jews. The inversion insults the memory of the dead. It also trades on 
the horrors of the camps in a cheap way.”20 
 
Coetzee’s narrative offers no indication of an authorial judgment about this character’s 
argument, other than Costello’s response, which is to sigh and simply ask her son, “Who 
is this man?” That is paltry evidence to conclude that Coetzee’s sympathy or rhetorical 
intent lies with either of these characters. The two characters are quite similar: Stern, the 
poet, writes in his note, “Forgive me if I am forthright. You said you were old enough not 
to have time to waste on niceties, and I am an old man too.”21 And in her debate with 
O’Hearne, Costello refers to a philosopher whose ideas offend her and she comments that 
she would be reluctant to share a meal with someone who espoused such ideas.22 Stern, 
for his part, refuses to share a meal with Costello, and is absent from the formal dinner 
following her lecture. 
 The episode between Costello and Stern is an example of the confusion and 
uncertainty that the text’s lecture/narrative form can provoke in the reader. And more 
than that, the comparison of industrial farming to genocide is an example marking a limit 
across which two parties cannot communicate. The comparison is a rhetorical choice 
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unlikely to succeed. Its effect is to affirm in their agreement those who already agree with 
the position of the person employing the comparison, while only further alienating those 
who do not already agree. The comparison throws into relief two opposing parties whose 
prior dispositions toward the topic are already mutually unintelligible. To one, it is self-
evident and powerfully convicting. To the other, it is absurd and repugnant.  
The 1997-1998 Tanner Lectures at Princeton included responses to Coetzee’s 
“lectures” from prominent scholars from a variety of disciplines relevant to Coetzee’s 
topic. Peter Singer responds to Coetzee by casting his own arguments in a short narrative. 
It depicts a dialog between Singer and his daughter about Singer’s difficulty in knowing 
how to respond to Coetzee’s lecture/narrative. Singer notices the same difficulty in 
reading The Lives of Animals in order to discover any authorial or rhetorical intent that I 
have been trying to parse. Singer’s persona complains: 
“But are they Coetzee’s arguments? . . . . They are Costello’s arguments. 
Coetzee’s fictional device enables him to distance himself from them . . . . 
Costello can blithely criticize the use of reason, or the need to have any clear 
principles or proscriptions, without Coetzee really committing himself to these 
claims. Maybe he really shares Norma’s very proper doubts about them.”23 
 
But the effect of distancing author from text and speaker from argument is, whether 
Coetzee intended it to be or not, more than simply clever. I hold the lack of commitment 
to a definite position or argument to be the very claim the text (if not the author) makes. 
Costello articulates the uncertain foundation of Coetzee’s text when she says, “I was 
hoping not to have to enunciate principles . . . ,” and “I have never been much interested 
in proscriptions, dietary or otherwise.”24 
                                                 
23. Peter Singer, reflection on The Lives of Animals by J.M. Coetzee, ed. Amy Gutmann 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 91. 





 Marjorie Garber, in her response to Coetzee’s “lectures,” asks what she calls the 
“central question for all literary critics”: “What does the form have to do with the 
content?”25 She describes The Lives of Animals as metafiction, places it in the genre of 
the academic novel,26 and notes the difficulty of taking any character to be Coetzee’s 
mouthpiece, writing, “We don’t know whose voice to believe.”27 Her ultimate response 
to her initial question about form and content is to conclude, “In these two elegant 
lectures we thought John Coetzee was talking about animals. Could it be, however, that 
all along he was really asking, ‘What is the value of literature?’”28 
 I agree that The Lives of Animals cannot be reduced to being about animals, but to 
conclude that the something more that it is about might be the “value of literature” seems 
also to be reductive. The reluctance to “enunciate principles” and pronounce 
“proscriptions” evident in The Lives of Animals, together with the effect of uncertainty it 
produces in its audience, amount to a claim about knowledge and the ability to speak (or 
write) that are enmeshed in any discussion of animals, in any reflection on the encounter 
with alterity that is the human/animal relationship. 
 Garber makes a passing comparison between The Lives of Animals and Plato’s 
dialogues.29 The comparison is apt. The metafictional puzzle that is the form of The Lives 
of Animals, functioning to confuse and defer meaning and to inhibit the communication 
                                                 
25. Marjorie Garber, reflection on The Lives of Animals by J.M. Coetzee, ed. Amy Gutmann 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 75. 
26. Ibid., 76. 
27. Ibid., 79. 
28. Ibid., 84. 





of an intended idea from the mind of the author to the mind of the listener or reader, is 
not a peculiarly postmodern form. It bears a strong resemblance to Plato’s dialogs and 
functions in many of the same ways. Coetzee works through philosophical problems by 
having characters discuss them in scenarios like those in which Plato’s characters work 
through philosophical ideas: quotidian encounters, debates private and public, formal 
dinners, and the occasion of prestigious out-of-town guests. Plato’s dialogs can be dialogs 
within dialogs (like Coetzee’s lecture within a lecture) and can have fairly elaborate and 
seemingly incidental narrative frames. Characters are developed as personalities and not 
simple personifications of philosophical positions, and identification of the author, Plato, 
with the dominant speaker, Socrates, may at times seem natural, but at others dubious. 
And as with Plato’s dialogs, so with Coetzee’s lecture/narrative: the stakes of the 
argument are to be found in the manner in which the argument is made as much as it is in 
any argumentative thread presented. Something is at stake within the text—between the 
interlocutors in the dialog—but something is at stake, too, between the author and the 
reader, in the reader’s textually mediated dialog with the author.  
In the Sophist, the Stranger claims that the form of the dialog, a conversation 
among a small group of men, is more edifying than is speech-making. Through dialog, an 
interlocutor’s errors and contradictions can be exposed and thus purged from the soul, 
whereas long speeches disguise error and contradictions, inducing listeners to overlook 
and accept the speaker’s mistakes. Dialog (“method of questions,” “method of 
dialogue,”30 “cross-questioning”31) brings an interlocutor to a state of knowledgeable 
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ignorance; it “purges him and makes him think that he knows only what he knows, and 
no more”.32  
The form of the dialog, while demonstrating the “method of questions,” puts the 
reader in a dialogic relationship with the text, which would itself otherwise be only the 
written analogue of a long-winded speech. So, too, with Coetzee’s lecture/story. Rather 
than explicate a position on a topic, Coetzee draws the listener/reader into a state of 
questioning regarding his chosen topic, as well as a state of uncertainty regarding its 
presentation. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals is like one of Plato’s dialogs in the use of 
characters, interpersonal conflicts, extra-philosophical motivations and conflicts to 
interpellate an active audience. More importantly, the dialogs are shot through with irony, 
in much the same way as Coetzee’s story (which voice to trust? who, if anyone, 
represents the author’s rhetorical intent?) and is at least as concerned, if not more, with 
exposing contradictions and error rather than resolving them. What matters is the 
performance of a method that resists and undermines the certitude and comfort of 
knowledge, leaving the reader bewildered in the face of a host of others: textual, human, 
and animal others. 
But Garber’s question remains: “What does the form have to do with the 
content?” The topic of animals is not merely a pretense for Coetzee’s exercise in form. 
The lecture/narrative form serves to confound the audience’s immediate understanding, 
provoking uncertainty and hesitation in the audience regarding their knowledge of the 
author as other. The topic of human/animal difference, which human language is 
inadequate to bridge, is actually quite a fitting topic. The keystone holding form and 






content together, when read against the arguments Costello has been making throughout 
the text, is the final vignette between Costello and her son. 
 Elizabeth Costello rejects Western philosophy’s rationalist and humanist assertion 
that humans, possessing reason, have some privileged access to knowledge of the world 
as it really is, knowledge of which animals are deprived. She rejects the assertion that 
reason and the universe are “of the same being” and she rejects that reason constitutes 
human being, instead asserting that reason is only “a certain spectrum of human 
thinking,” only “one tendency in human thought”33, and perhaps no more than the 
preferred mode of thinking of a small group of humans: 
“Might it not be that the phenomenon we are examining here is, rather than the 
flowering of a faculty that allows access to the secrets of the universe, the 
specialism of a rather narrow self-regenerating intellectual tradition whose forte is 
reasoning…which for its own motives it tries to install at the center of the 
universe?”34 
 
Humanistic rationalism, as Costello describes it, is a closed system and “a vast 
tautology.”35 Norma’s objection that “[t]here is no position outside of reason where you 
can stand and lecture about reason and pass judgement on reason,”36 is, from Costello’s 
perspective, a validation of her argument rather than a critique of it. A system that 
excludes so much in order to privilege its own construction of reality is impoverished in 
its totality. 
 Rejecting reason means that in order to level the difference between human and 
animal Costello does not need to grant humanlike reasoning to animals. Instead she 
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argues that animal thought is neither less than nor more than nor even equal to human 
reason but merely different, and that human reason, regarding the animal other at least, is 
debased. She demonstrates her argument through a reading of The Mentality of Apes 
(1917), in which Wolfgang Köhler describes his ethological experiments on an ape called 
Sultan. The ape must solve various problems in order to acquire bananas. Such 
experiments of the same ilk are part of the lore of animal behavior and cognition. And 
while they are anecdotally offered as proof that certain animal species or certain animal 
individuals might display human-like reasoning abilities, the experiments are 
simultaneously taken as evidence of animal inferiority. Köhler’s conclusions follow the 
same pattern. But Costello argues that Köhler’s experiments on Sultan merely 
demonstrate the animal’s conformity to an absurdly conceived scenario premised on a 
simplistic version of human reasoning: 
“At every turn Sultan is driven to think the less interesting thought. From the 
purity of speculation (Why do men behave like this?) he is relentlessly propelled 
toward lower, practical, instrumental reason (How does one use this to get that?) 
and thus toward acceptance of himself as primarily an organism with an appetite 
that needs to be satisfied.”37 
 
Such experiments, to Costello, do nothing more than demonstrate the limitation of 
humanistic rationalism. As she says to O’Hearne: 
“[T]he program of scientific experimentation that leads you to conclude that 
animals are imbeciles is profoundly anthropocentric. It values being able to find 
your way out of a sterile maze, ignoring the fact that if the researcher who 
designed the maze were to be parachuted into the jungles of Borneo, he or she 
would be dead of starvation in a week….It is the experiments themselves that are 
imbecile.”38 
 
                                                 
37. Ibid., 29. 





Over against reason, Costello promulgates a doctrine of sympathetic imagination, 
which she develops through her critique of Thomas Nagel’s essay, “What Is It Like to Be 
a Bat?” Whereas the kind of thinking typified by Köhler conceives of the animal mind 
not so much as different from the human mind as it is lesser, Nagel emphasizes the 
otherness of the animal mind as being a way of thinking, perceiving, and experiencing the 
world to which the human mind can have no access. Costello quotes Nagel: “I want to 
know what it is like for a bat to be a bat. Yet if I try to imagine this I am restricted by the 
sources of my own mind, and those resources are inadequate to the task”. 39 In other 
words, the difference between a bat and a human is insurmountable; the human mind and 
its capacity to reason cannot have access to all ways of knowing, thinking, being. 
 But Costello is dissatisfied with Nagel, too. She maintains that it is possible for 
human thought to surmount difference, even the last limit of otherness: death. Humans 
are capable, she maintains, of “thinking our way into”40 a nonhuman state. Refusing 
scientific reason and denying the strict bounds placed on empathy by Nagel, Costello 
offers “sympathetic imagination,” as a way of thinking that has “no bounds”: “If I can 
think my way into the existence of a being who has never existed [i.e. a fictional 
character], then I can think my way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an 
oyster, any being with whom I share the substrate of life.”41 
 Sympathetic imagination is an appealing idea. And even though Costello’s 
interlocutors are skeptical, if not incredulous, it is not a purely fanciful idea. For example, 
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the Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness, produced at the Francis Crick Memorial 
Conference on Consciousness in Human and non-Human Animals at Cambridge 
University in 2012 surveys the cumulative work of several related neurological fields 
comparing human and animal brain structures, and then asserts that humans and animals 
have more in common than humanistic rationalists have generally been willing to 
concede: “[T]he weight of evidence indicates that humans are not unique in possessing 
the neurological substrates that generate consciousness.”42 If humans and many animals 
share similar neurological structures then perhaps it is only a small step to imagine that 
they share similar experiences of being. Additionally, ethologists Alexandra C. Horowitz 
and Marc Bekoff argue in defense of a cautious, meticulous anthropomorphism in the 
scientific study of animal behavior; they call anthropomorphism “the explanatory 
lubrication . . . between visible behaviors and the seemingly inaccessible internal states of 
the animal.”43 Costello’s own readings of several poems (Rilke’s “The Panther,” and 
Hughes’ “The Jaguar” and “Second Glance at the Jaguar”) by Ted Hughes and Rilke 
demonstrate that a poetics of sympathetic imagination is more than simple, sentimental 
conjecture about animals. However plausible sympathetic imagination might be, or 
however benevolent seeming it is, sympathetic imagination looks a lot like the reason 
Costello rejects in so far as both are capacities for special knowledge of the animal other 
that humans unilaterally grant to themselves. 
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 But plausibility aside, the idea of sympathetic imagination becomes especially 
salient when it is considered in light of the final vignette with which Coetzee closes his 
lecture/narrative.  
 Even though she has been arguing that sympathetic imagination is a capacity with 
“no bounds” through which one can understand the experience of another being, Costello 
herself encounters a limit to her capacity to understand the experience of other humans. 
Those beings that should be to her the most familiar and accessible become frighteningly 
alien. In answering her son’s question as to why she has become “so intense about the 
animal business,”44 Costello reveals a profound crisis in her psyche—a crisis of 
conscience and a crisis of consciousness. 
She cannot reconcile the apparent goodness of the people around her with their 
complicity in practices she finds horrifying and deems to be evil. She cannot fathom how 
the people around her reconcile for themselves their benevolent actions in one sphere of 
life and their deplorable actions in another. The experience of being a meat-eating human 
is beyond the reach of her sympathetic imagination. But her struggle to understand those 
non-vegetarian, tallow-soap using human others deepens when her consternation 
becomes unsettling to her perception of the reality around her and her own experience of 
being herself. “It’s that I no longer know where I am….Am I dreaming, I say to myself? 
Yet I’m not dreaming….This is life. Everyone else comes to terms with it, why can’t 
you?”45 
                                                 






She repeats, emphatically, “Why can’t you?” and that question represents a 
fundamental shift in consciousness from both the rationalistic humanism she rejects and 
the principle of sympathetic imagination she espouses. Those two ways of thinking are 
oriented outward from the self and satisfy themselves by asserting knowledge of/over the 
other. But the question “Why can’t you?” is asked by a self whose gaze has been turned 
back and encounters the self as alien, as other. I regards itself as you. And the question, 
demanded of the self by the self, remains unanswered. The question yields no knowledge. 
 The question, “Why can’t you?” reflects the structure of a peculiar response to 
alterity, whether that other is human, animal, or otherwise. Thinking about the other 
often runs first in a single direction, outward from me to you (or it), and often does little 
more than trace that path between the self and the object of its gaze. This is the kind of 
thinking that characterizes the structure of the many –isms: racism, sexism, ableism, 
speciesism, etc., in which the other is not recognized as something more than object 
perhaps in possession of a being and a gaze of its own. Difference in this scheme 
(however malevolent, benevolent, or innocuous) is understood as simply “different from 
me.” But in the structure represented by Costello’s “Why can’t you?”, thinking about 
others becomes reflexive and some crisis drives back the self’s outward gaze to encounter 
the self as other. For Costello, the struggle to surmount the difference that occludes her 
understanding of the people around her becomes a struggle to understand herself. 
Postulating that the people (and animals) upon which her gaze falls themselves have a 
being and outward gaze like her own, she strives to understand that being and experience 
that outward gaze as if it were her own. She fails, with the result of estrangement from 





That state of uncertainty is not the result of an apotheosis. It is not a transcendent 
state. The mode of being and experience represented by Costello’s “Why can’t you?” is 
not a post-human mode in which the human self has attained to something more or other 
than itself. This uncertain self has not colonized and acquired for itself some foreign 
mode of being and experiencing. The end result of Costello’s sympathetic imagination is 
not a successful crossing of the abyss of alterity between self and other. Instead, 
Costello’s sympathetic imagination probes the limit of the self, encounters the abyss of 
alterity, fails to overcome it, and shrinks back within human bounds chastised and more 
cautious. 
 
The trope of a limit and an abyss between the self and other, specifically between 
human and animal, brings me to Derrida’s “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to 
Follow). In 2002, Critical Inquiry published as “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More 
to Follow)” the first portion of an extended address Jacques Derrida gave at a 1997 
conference. The entire address was published in 2008 as The Animal That Therefore I Am 
and included Derrida’s treatment of the modern philosophical tradition as it regards the 
topic of animals. He devotes a great deal of attention to Kant, Heidegger, Levinas, and 
Lacan. But the first portion is especially interesting because it introduces his themes 
clustered around readings of narratives: Lewis Caroll’s Through the Lookingglass, the 
second account of creation in Genesis, and a personal anecdote about being seen naked 
by his cat. And just as with Coetzee’s narrative/lecture, its manifold texture is as 





In The Lives of Animals, Coetzee speaks not in the first-person nor in the 
academic third-person, but from behind the veil of a narratival third-person through 
which an argument must be inferred by the audience from a series fictional events and a 
cast of invented characters. Like Coetzee, Derrida does not speak in the conventional 
academic third-person (the disembodied, timeless, and placeless voice scholars tend to 
employ when pronouncing upon texts and truths). Unlike Coetzee, Derrida does not 
structure his address with the scaffolding of an elaborate pretense. But even so, as he 
shifts continually between the first and third persons, he does not settle into an 
unselfconscious mode that purports to be a direct unmediated representation of his mind 
to the minds of his audience. The digressive structure of his sentences and the baroque, 
recursive ordering of his arguments prevent his audience from forgetting the mediation of 
the text. Derrida reminds his audience repeatedly that the conference at which he is 
speaking is entitled “The Autobiographical Animal” and he self-consciously struggles to 
present himself before his audience as exposed in his entanglement with words. His very 
first sentence: "To begin with, I would like to entrust myself to words that, were it 
possible, would be naked.”46 His thought cannot be naked, nor can his words be naked, 
try as he might to expose both. Instead, the attempt to reveal obscures as much as it 
exposes, and to Derrida as an elusive an animal in his own text as Coetzee is in his. 
“The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)” might be thought of as a 
narrative in which other narratives are embedded. The outermost narrative sphere is the 
one created by the publication of Derrida's transcript in Critical Inquiry; the audience is 
no longer an audience of listeners present with the speaker, but an audience of readers, 
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reconstructing from printed word a historical event, a thing that happened, i.e. Derrida 
speaking those printed words (in French and not English) to a group of people at Cerisy-
la-Salle, France, in the summer of 1997. In the next narrative sphere, Derrida is reading 
those same words (which later translated and publish in Critical Inquiry) to a living 
audience from a manuscript. That manuscript is in turn a record (and its reading is a 
reconstruction) of a prior event: Derrida, alone, composing his address, which itself could 
not have been a singular, discrete, moment, in which the text appeared ex nihilo. In the 
innermost narrative sphere is Carroll’s story about Alice, the Yahwist’s story about the 
naming of the animals, and Derrida in his bathroom naked before his cat—each of which 
is taken up again in each succeeding sphere of narrative. Derrida is to Derrida as Coetzee 
is to Costello. Through the publication of Derrida’s words after the fact of their having 
been spoken—making them a kind of fiction—Derrida becomes a fictional character of 
his own invention set forth in print for absent readers to later reconstruct (or deconstruct, 
as it were), and interpret, inventing Derrida anew for themselves. 
My description of “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)” as 
spheres within spheres might suggest, on the one hand, that there is a center—a point of 
origin, an essential core—from which the text emanates. To read Derrida that way would 
be un-Derridean. On the other hand, it might suggest a continually deferred center, an 
infinitesimal point of origin that might never be located. Perhaps a better model than an 
onion-like figure would be the interfoliated assemblage that is a printed text: dissociated, 
disordered fragments on a flat field, folded and folded again until they resemble a unified 
whole, an illusion of natural and necessary linear sequence masking the breaks, edges, 





Either way, metaphors will break down and fail to fully serve the purpose of 
making my assertion seem inevitable, that is, the assertion that there is a correspondence 
between the form and character of Derrida’s writing and the argument he makes. Derrida 
writes about time and history as non-linear, and he writes about them in a non-linear 
fashion. His text is digressive and recursive, and rather than progressing through 
arguments, it accumulates them until an entangled mass is produced. 
For example, with the opening remarks, Derrida places himself, his text, and his 
audience within a longer narrative. Many conference talks begin with remarks of 
professed thanks (perfunctory or self-deprecating or flattering or even sincere) to 
conference organizers and other pertinent parties, but Derrida carries on at length with 
general and specific expressions of gratitude and explanations of how the present 
conference came to be, how its topic fits in a larger trajectory of conferences at Cerisy 
and how his own address fits within that trajectory and within the trajectory of his own 
work. As a preamble, the first three-plus pages of "The Animal That Therefore I Am 
(More to Follow)" seems perhaps excessive, especially to a reader who is not part of the 
in-crowd of Cerisy conference-goers (or the in-crowd of Derrida readers), but it does in 
fact work to frame the opening moment of Derrida's address within a view of history that 
Derrida's later discussion develops, that structures the whole of the text, that echoes 
Derrida's personal encounter with the gaze of an animal: a history with continuity and 
difference but without origin or telos, a history that progresses recursively, neither 
circular nor linear (or perhaps both) with the present moment figured as the point of 
contact between a rolling wheel and the roadway it rolls upon; a history in which an event 





occurred at a specific time in the past even as it is perpetually recurring; a history in 
which mythical time and clock time, individual memory and cultural memory, are 
enmeshed. Derrida's text itself performs recursivity in its own recursive and digressive 
style, evident in this one of many similar moments in the preamble alone: "Some of you 
here, Maurice de Gandillac first of all, whom I wish to greet and thank in pride of place, 
know that about forty years ago, in 1959, our wonderful hosts here at Cerisy were already 
offering me their hospitality—and it was the moment of my very first lecture, in fact the 
first time I spoke in public."47 In these polite remarks, Derrida brings his present moment 
into contact with an original event ("my very first lecture"), that occurred at a more-or-
less definite time ("about forty years ago, in 1959"), that was also progressive and 
recurring, individual and communal. 
As an example relying on more than a few phrases, Derrida’s treatment of his 
anecdote about being seen naked by his cat might better demonstrate a correspondence 
between Derrida’s idea of history and his manner of structure his text, with the additional 
advantage of being a key element in Derrida’s discussion of human/animal difference. 
At the center of "The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)" is an 
anecdote Derrida tells about being seen naked by his cat and the crisis of self-
consciousness that it precipitates. To say the anecdote is at the center of the text is 
inaccurate: more accurate would be to say that it is integral to the text. Derrida's telling of 
the anecdote is consistent with the rest of his text in that the anecdote tells not of a 
singular past event but an event that, while having happened at some point for a "first 
                                                 





time," is recurring and progressive to the same extent that it was originary, marking off a 
before and after. 
He doesn't tell the story all at once. First, it is offered abstractly and generically, 
by way of example—as a hypothetical, almost. Then it is articulated as a specific moment 
in time, a disruptive and singular event. Later, it is a mundane recurrence. In its most 
concrete iteration, the incident is one anyone with a cat would recognize, or, for that 
matter, anyone with dog or any other domestic animal free to roam the house: the animal 
sees you with your clothes off, you see that it sees you, perhaps it even sees you seeing it 
seeing you with your clothes off, and you wonder, what does the animal think of all this? 
The resulting perplexity, for Derrida and for many who have been in the same 
situation, is like trying to reason through the question about the fallen tree in the forest: If 
an animal sees you with your clothes off, has it seen you naked? Derrida's answer, as 
expected, resolves none of the perplexity: "The animal would be in nonnudity because it 
is nude, and man in nudity to the extent that he is no longer nude."48 But the answer is 
less important than the perplexity itself, produced when confronted by the other and 
noticing being noticed with no recourse to know what the noticing means to the other, 
"seeing oneself seen naked under a gaze that is vacant to the extent of being bottomless, 
at the same time innocent and cruel perhaps, perhaps sensitive and impassive, good and 
bad, uninterpretable, unreadable, undecidable, abyssal and secret."49 The gaze of the 
animal other displaces one's human self: "[I] no longer know who I am (following) or 
who it is I am chasing, who is following me or hunting me. Who comes before and who 
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is after whom? I know longer know where my head is. . . . I no longer know how to 
respond . . . ."50 
The human and the animal are two aspects of the same thought in the Western 
cultural and philosophical tradition. The idea of the human is not imagined without the 
idea of the animal, and so encounters with animals are formative in the history of human 
self-consciousness. At some definite point in time or during some progressive phase 
("since time, since so long ago" is Derrida's refrain) an "abyssal limit," "a limit that grows 
and multiplies by feeding on an abyss,"51 opened between human and animal. Derrida 
reads the biblical story of the naming of the animals in Genesis (part of the second 
creation story told in Genesis) as typifying the recurring, originary event by which the 
"abyssal limit" between human and animal is discursively defined. The story is 
symptomatic of a structure underlying human consciousness (in the Western account at 
least) and the human relationship to the animal, a chain of gazes imagined to move in 
only one direction, from God to man to animal: "He lets Adam, he lets man, man alone, 
Ish without Ishah, the woman, freely call out names. He lets him go about naming alone. 
But he is waiting in the wings, watching over this man alone with a mixture of curiosity 
and authority."52 God sees man, but is not seen, and man "under surveillance, under the 
gaze of Jehovah"53 sees the animal "without allowing himself to be seen or named" by the 
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animal.54 The animal is not a participant in the event, only an object of knowledge; the 
animal has no gaze or knowledge of its own. 
For Derrida there are "at bottom, two types of discourse, two positions of 
knowledge": 
In the first place there are those texts signed by people who have no doubt seen, 
observed, analyzed, reflected on the animal, but who have never been seen seen 
by the animal. Their gaze has never intersected with that of an animal directed at 
them (forget about their being naked). If, indeed, they did happen to be seen seen 
furtively by the animal one day, they took no (thematic, theoretical, or 
philosophical) account of it.55 
 
On the other hand, are texts "whose signatories are first and foremost poets or prophets," 
those who have seen themselves seen by the animal they have seen and have endeavored 
to speak from that decentered subject position, to "[take] upon themselves the address of 
an animal that addresses them, before even having the time or the power to take 
themselves off, to take themselves off with clothes off or in a bathrobe."56 The decentered 
subject position of the seen seen poet (and here Costello would agree emphatically) is, 
according to Derrida, not heretofore attested in any philosophical, theoretical, political, or 
legal discourse. Instead these discourses largely reflect the subject position of Descartes' 
cogito ergo sum, followed (I would observe) by a tacit and implicit et omnia sum: "I 
think therefore I am . . . everything: what I cannot think has no being.” 
 For the first discursive camp, nothing is outside human knowledge or outside the 
possibility of assimilation into human knowledge. (Though Costello would see herself as 
opposed to this camp of rationalists, I see her notion of "sympathetic imagination" as 
                                                 
54. Ibid., 386. 
55. Ibid., 382. 





squarely within it.) On the other hand are poets and prophets, whose subjectivity has been 
disturbed by the experience of crossing gazes with the animal. The knowledge gained 
from seeing themselves being seen is not knowledge of the animal other's occluded self 
(nor knowledge of the world or oneself as the animal sees it) but instead a self-conscious 
knowledge, a removal of oneself from the center of being and knowledge, allowing for 
the possibility that one's knowledge is inevitably limited and predetermined by one's 
position and capacities, and allowing for the possibility that beyond one's knowledge are 
ways of knowing and being that one can never access or assimilate. 
For Derrida, the animal and the human are discursively bound, and that discourse 
is bound up in narrative and history as much as it is in syllogism and philosophy. These 
entanglements are evident in the form and style of his essay, exhibiting the same qualities 
of recursive progressivity, interrupted by constant digression and deferrals, and 
disorientation and uncertainty. In addition to what I have already noted regarding 
Derrida's opening comments, his anecdote about his cat and his reading of Genesis, a 
rhetorical posture of uncertainty is evident in his style, in his manner of expressing his 
thoughts in a manner that resists the notion of writing as an expression of thought, that 
resists making the text a simple threshold across which the writer ushers the reader into a 
realm of knowledge. Digressions, tortured phrases ("It follows, itself; it follows itself. It 
could say 'I am,' 'I follow,' 'I follow myself,' 'I am (in following) myself.'"57), and 
sentences manifoldly compounded might seem to be evidence of clouded thoughts 
merely expressed in murky writing or, perhaps, to be a deliberate and obtuse occlusion of 
                                                 





Derrida's mind from the audience. 58 Maybe such is indeed the case; his writing 
unquestionably makes for difficult reading. But maybe his writing is a performance of a 
rhetorical posture of uncertainty toward his subject matter, and so only reluctantly asserts 
knowledge, whether of the self or the other, and is reluctant to ever assert only one 
possibility. Derrida’s writing is also a performance of a rhetorical posture of uncertainty 
toward the audience. It evinces an acute consciousness of the abyss between self and 
other created by language even as language attempts to cross it. 
Consider Derrida's thoughts on autobiography. The title of the conference at 
Cerisy is "The Autobiographical Animal," but autobiography in Derrida’s treatment is 
not the label of a genre of narrative writing. Instead, Derrida construes the word as 
something more like the writing of the living self, or the discourse that creates the self. A 
sense of confession lurks in the sense of autobiography that calls to mind the literary 
genre, a "discourse on the self" that presumes, because of "a fault, an evil, an ill," an 
obligation, for the sake of "truth," to divulge oneself, expose oneself.59 Derrida asks if 
autobiography is possible without this "logic of debt and owing": "Has there been, since 
so long ago, a place and a meaning for autobiography before original sin and before the 
religions of the book?"60 "I am trying to speak to you," he says, from that time "since so 
long ago," a conceptual reality that, in the scheme of his reading of Genesis, would be 
before man had founded the abyss between human and animal by his naming of the 
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animals, a human being before shame. Derrida's writing is autobiographical, not in the 
sense that he is telling us the story of his life, but in the sense that he is struggling to 
present himself as a living being through language, against an ancient discourse that 
seems to have predetermined his writing of himself and the other to whom he addresses 
himself. 
His writing is an uphill battle and it engages the audience in that battle. Derrida’s 
comment on passage he quotes from Heidegger is: "I think I understand what that means  
. . . ; I can understand it on the surface, in terms of what it means, but at the same time I 
understand nothing."61 For me to comment the same in response to Derrida is not because 
of a failure of Derrida's writing, and not (entirely) a failure of me as a reader, but a 
necessary intermediary position in the encounter between self and other, between writer 
and reader—a position fraught with uncertainty.62 
Another example might be Derrida's neologism, l'animot. As with the anecdote 
about his cat, Derrida does not introduce this element of his text all at once. He sneaks it 
in, hinting at it before calling attention to it. First, animot and animots appear without 
comment,63 and would not have been as noticeable to the ears of Derrida’s initial 
conference audience as they are to the eye of reader encountering Derrida’s text in 
translation. Then, he explicitly introduces l’animot, "a chimerical word that sound[s] as 
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though it contravened the laws of the French language” and exclaims "Ecce animot."64 
The term, with its singular article (l') and plural sounding form (-mot would be heard as –
maux, the plural ending of animal in French), juxtaposes the animal as "a single and 
fundamentally homogeneous set”65 with the heterogeneity of animals as "an irreducible 
living multiplicity of mortals."66  And substituting mot (the French word for word) for the 
ending -maux is a signal that to think about the animal, and thus the human, is to think 
about language, "the unique and indivisible limit held to separate man from animal."67 
This last element, -mot, because it is not easily distinguished aurally from -maux, but 
would be visually striking in the printed text, also signals the fraught relationship 
between speech and writing, and the whole host of problems of differentiation and 
representation that plague language. 
The rhetorical function of Derrida's awkward neologism is to jar the ear and shake 
the listener's thought out of complacent passivity. Derrida promises his audience to avoid 
overusing l’animot out of respect for "French ears too sensitive to spelling and grammar" 
and asks them to do the work themselves of "silently substitut[ing] animot" for "the 
animal" and "the animals."68 When Derrida's address is read in translation, l'animot, 
untouched by the translator, likewise remains a stumbling block to the eye's smooth scan 
across the page, repelling yet also engaging the reader. Derrida, calling upon his audience 
as accomplices, willing or no, uses words against themselves, breaking words by 
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smashing them together so that the same energy that causes them to crumble causes them 
to adhere and to lodge like a rough, irritating bit of gravel in the mind of the 
listener/reader, to excite thought by neural chafing, and produce a brief moment of 
disorientation. 
 
In the title of this paper, I call my two primary texts animal texts. This is not a 
phrase I am attempting to use to identify a category, type, or genre to which The Lives of 
Animals and “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)” belong. I simply mean 
to use animal in an adjectival sense, modifying the vague, yet overburdened term text, to 
say that these two works share some qualities in common with animals, and with each 
other. They are not just texts about animals—animals as living creatures and animals as 
ideas—but texts that are also animal-like: wily, difficult to hold, pin down, and pen up, 
inscrutable, unpredictable, uncooperative and at times unresponsive, but at other times 
seemingly friendly, yielding, familiar, and almost like they could be domesticated. 
Really, any text could be so described, but these two texts especially exploit the 
inevitable problems a text presents as a site of encounter between two (or more) others. 
And their exploitation of those problems mirrors the problems of human encounters with 
animals that they discuss: on the one hand, familiarity and understanding with the 
text/animal, and on the other hand, estrangement and misunderstanding with the 
text/animal. 
 What is more important to me than asserting the idea of these texts as animal texts 
and making any claims about their peculiar or exceptional qualities, is an assertion that 





an intellectual uncertainty in their readers analogous to the crisis face-to-face encounters 
with alterity can produce—or that I believe them to be able to produce. But in the end, I 
have to wonder if I have found in these texts only the thing that I set out to look for and 
not what is “really” there, or potentially there, in the text. Are my readings only an 
example of anthropomorphism: instead of attributing my human qualities to an animal, I 
attempt to legitimate my own a priori assertions by describing them as qualities inherent 
in the text? Perhaps as a human encountering an animal other, the alterity confronted 
within that encounter is merely a reflection of myself—a self I already experience for 
reasons unknown to me according to a particular self/other dynamic. Likewise, close-
reading a text would merely be to re-write it in my own image. 
In any case, what I wish to assert—as a bald, unwarranted assertion if 
necessary—is that uncertainty is an efficacious disposition. It is not a proposition or 
operation in a syllogistic chain, but an attitude toward knowledge with productive results. 
The “Why can’t you?” of Coetzee’s fictional Costello and the seen seen of Derrida’s 
autobiographical Derrida are models of a self disrupted by an encounter with an other, 
but they are not models of a universal process like the mirror stage or the realization of 
object permanence. As Derrida notes, many have “observed, analyzed, reflected on the 
animal,” but not all have “been seen seen by the animal.”69 The disrupted self has a 
disposition of uncertainty regarding knowledge of the other, be it an animal, a human, or 
any of the other others composing the world, which can be efficacious. Operating with a 
confident certainty, humans have fixed the whole of the world upon a map and placed 
themselves in the center of that map; even what is undiscovered has a location on the map 
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and what humans don’t know, they know they will soon know it. But a disposition of 
uncertainty, reluctant to claim knowledge of what is “true” or “real,” unfurls the map of 
the world further to imagine what might be rather than what is or must be. In other words, 
certainty restricts the conditions of invention, whereas uncertainty multiplies them. 
Finally, to suggest what a disposition of uncertainty has to do with rhetoric, 
briefly consider two loci classici. 
First, Aristotle: Rhetoric’s “function is not so much to persuade, as to find out in 
each case the existing means of persuasion.”70 Above all, rhetoric is an art of invention 
and its aim is to discover (invent) efficacious means of thinking and speaking about the 
matter at hand (whatever it may be) in a way that is not merely theoretical but that 
accomplishes some work. But Aristotle assumes a basic human capacity for real 
knowledge of the world. Some paragraphs prior to what I’ve just quoted, Aristotle asserts 
that “men have a sufficient natural capacity for the truth and indeed in most cases attain 
to it; wherefore one who divines well in regard to the truth will also be able to divine well 
in regard to probabilities.”71 I would assert, however, that rhetoric’s heuristic function is 
better served by a rejection of an attitude of certainty. A greater multiplicity of the 
“means of persuasion” might be “found out” if the rhetor instead embraces a disposition 
of uncertainty and the unlikelihood that any person can ever know everything that need 
be know, might be known, could be known in order to establish any given path of action 
with entire certainty in any given time and place. 
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Second, Quintilian, who borrows from Cato a phrase that many in turn have 
borrowed from Quintilian: an orator should be “a good man, skilled in speaking.”72 
Quintilian emphasizes the importance of the goodness of the orator as a “man” to the 
degree that he asserts that no one who is not good cannot learn to speak well: 
But if the view that a bad man is necessarily a fool is not merely held by 
philosophers, but is the universal belief of ordinary men, the fool will most 
assuredly never become an orator. To this must be added the fact that the mind 
will not find leisure ever for the study of the noblest of tasks, unless it first be free 
from vice.73 
But I assert that a disposition of uncertainty—especially regarding the other—is a great 
virtue, and that the speech of a person with a disposition of uncertainty is likely to be 
circumspect, restrained, perhaps even stammering and tending toward silence (or toward 
digressive verbosity), so that lucid and readily persuasive speech is likely to in fact 
proceed from an evil “man.” Cogency is cause for suspicion.
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